Swell Liquid Staking
Tier 3swell-liquid-staking
Liquid StakingSwell is a non-custodial liquid staking protocol
Security score
5.6/10
Research 29 Oct 2026 UTC
Known contract addresses
Not measured yet
Verified source available
Unknown
Measured lines of own deployed code
4,770
Collected reports
6
Analysis Overview
Protocol Overview
Code Security
Economic Security
Team & Transparency
Governance
Cross-Analysis
Who controls
Research: 29 Oct 2026 UTC
Not measured
Recent control events
Not measured
Governance voting
Not measured
Audit coverage
Audit coverage could not be verified
Measured lines: 4,770 · Measured files: 22
Audit scope not stated
Unmeasured files: 0 · Unmeasured components: 11
See audits and sourcesLoss cover
TVL at research time: $28,495,414.27
No loss-cover funds documented in this research.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary: Swell Liquid Staking
Swell Liquid Staking (the swETH product) is in an open incident. DefiLlama shows about $28.5M of TVL (deposits), all on Ethereum, and the sources do not say whether that figure covers swETH, rswETH or both . A Swell X post dated 2026-10-23 (source reliability: unverified publisher) announces a pause of deposits and withdrawals for swETH and rswETH. The pause flags were still set on-chain on 2026-10-29. The cause, the size of any rate error and any loss are not confirmed by a reliable source. Treat the position as impaired until Swell publishes a corrected rate, a root cause and a reopening plan.
Safety Rating
Overall Score: 5.6/10 Dimension scores: Code security 6.0 · Economic security 3.9 · Team transparency 5.7 · Governance 5.0 · Track record 8.0
- Code security
- 6.0 points
- Economic security
- 3.9 points
- Team transparency
- 5.7 points
- Governance
- 5.0 points
- Track record
- 8.0 points
The rating reflects an unresolved incident, a closed exit route, and audits that cannot be tied to the contracts running today. Scores below are shown as code-rendered values; this text does not restate them.
Scores by Dimension
| Dimension | Key Finding |
|---|---|
| Code Security | One Hexens review of the 2024 swETH update found 1 medium and 7 low/informational findings, but no audit is tied to a deployed address |
| Economic Security | Withdrawals are paused, so principal is inaccessible through the protocol and solvency cannot be shown |
| Team Transparency | Swell has a named legal operator, but only one named leader, and that profile rests on third-party pages |
| Governance | On the measured rswETH path, a small multisig behind a 7-day timelock, not token holders, controls upgrades; fund-moving roles and swETH controls are unresolved or not measured, and captures of the Snapshot voting space (unverified publishers) show no proposals ; on the measured rswETH side one pauser signer can freeze exits |
| Track Record | Listed since 2023-04-27 with no DefiLlama hacks record, but an October 2026 pause of unconfirmed cause and a reported April 2026 bridge pause (from Swell X posts, source reliability: unverified publisher, unconfirmed) sit in the history |
The Track Record card is mechanical: the cross-analysis notes it uses an empty hacks dataset and "does not reflect the live event" .
What This Protocol Does
Swell lets a user stake ETH without running a validator and receive swETH, a token whose value against ETH rises as validators earn rewards. ETH is pooled into groups of 32 ETH, and each group becomes a validator run by a permissioned node operator. The record covers swETH only. rswETH (liquid restaking) and other family products are context, except where they share code, keys or incident exposure.
Documented vs On-Chain
- Swell's docs describe the rate as set in part by a Chainlink proof-of-reserve oracle with a daily balance update . The on-chain rswETH contract also has a
repricefunction with a 1% cap per step and a one-hour minimum . The overview concludes the rate is likely moved by a privileged bot-role submitter. The swETH reprice holder and cap were not read. - A Swell X post of 2026-10-23 (source reliability: unverified publisher) says deposits and withdrawals are paused. On Ethereum at block 26300483 (2026-10-29), the swETH access-control contract still reports withdrawals paused.
- A press report (source reliability: unverified publisher) puts the last clean swETH rate near 1.133 ETH. On-chain at block 26300482 (2026-10-29) the contract rate is about 1.203 ETH. The clean rate is unconfirmed.
- An archived Balancer review (source reliability: unverified publisher) lists the admin multisig as 3/5. On-chain at block 26300146 (2026-10-29) the rswETH admin Safe is 4-of-7, and the older value is treated as stale.
Key Strengths
- Upgrades on the measured rswETH contracts pass a 7-day timelock administered by a 4-of-7 Safe. For swETH the delay is inferred from a shared owner address (an assessment, not a direct read) . The governance report does not confirm swETH owners or delays and calls the match to rswETH unverified .
- swETH (2024 liquid staking update) had an independent Hexens review: 1 medium and 7 low/informational findings, all fixed or acknowledged. Its match to deployed code is not confirmed.
- Withdrawals go through a queue, so a same-transaction deposit-and-redeem loop is blocked by design.
- Swell publishes a named legal operator, contract address tables and audit lists.
Key Risks
- Exits stay closed and the rate may be reset (magnitude: swETH and rswETH exit route closed; likelihood: high that exits stay closed until Swell acts). A Swell X post (source reliability: unverified publisher, unconfirmed) says the next step is to return NAV (the exchange rate) to the correct value before reopening. The size and direction of the correction are unconfirmed. If the press-reported clean rate (unverified publisher) were right, the swETH rate would fall about 5.8%. For rswETH a single signer of a 1-of-5 Safe can pause, and, for swETH only, the audited 2024 update had a pause with no automatic resume (acknowledged); whether the current swETH deployment differs was not compared, and the sources do not show that rswETH shares that behaviour .
- Misuse of the rate-reporting (bot) role after reopening (magnitude: unknown for swETH, severe for rswETH if repeated capped steps compound; likelihood: medium, an assessment with low confidence). Who holds the swETH repricing role is not known, and no swETH step cap is confirmed. The audited design checks the bot's figure against a proof-of-reserves oracle, but that is the audited version and not shown to be current.
- Compromised signers or infrastructure reaching the upgrade path (magnitude: loss of pooled ETH reachable by upgraded contracts; likelihood: low). A press report (source reliability: unverified publisher) alleges that four malicious upgrade contracts able to take about 2,500 ETH were deployed but not queued. Both the deployment and the amount are unconfirmed, and the cross-analysis calls the related arithmetic an unconfirmed input . Nothing ties any signer to a breach. The 7-day timelock covers only the measured rswETH upgrade path: the delay and holders for the rswETH staker-proxy upgrade function and other fund-moving permissions are unresolved, so the timelock may not cover every path to funds . The claim that nothing was queued comes only from the press report (source reliability: unverified publisher), and the timelock queue was not read directly . The low band rests on the 7-day public window on the measured path .
- No audit tied to the contracts running today. Deployed code was not compared with any audited version, so this is "not compared", not a measured mismatch. The latest swETH audit is from February 2024, before the October 2026 incident.
- Thin exit liquidity. The only measured DEX depth (rswETH) is zero at 2% price impact, and swETH depth is not measured.
Critical Findings
- The Hexens 2024 liquid staking review's single medium finding (token-queue reentrancy by a BOT-role holder) was fixed.
- The code report lists two critical items, both from the 2022-03-11 SoftStack/Chainsulting audit of an earlier swETH version. One (
swNFTUpgrade.sol, initialize not protected) is acknowledged; the team says it is guarded at proxy level, and this was not checked against code. The other is reported in the audit's executive summary, not itemized, and marked fixed. - Operationally, the open October 2026 pause is the most urgent matter. Its cause and any loss are unconfirmed.
Recommendation
Not suitable for users who need access to their ETH soon or who cannot tolerate a possible exchange-rate reset. Withdrawals are closed, the corrected rate is unpublished, and the key facts (who holds the swETH rate and pause roles, and backing versus liabilities) are not public. Only risk-tolerant holders who can wait should stay exposed. Do not assume 1.203 ETH per swETH on redemption. New deposits should wait for a post-mortem, a published corrected rate and key rotation notice.
Report Sections
- Protocol Overview
- Code Security
- Economic Security
- Social & Team
- Governance
- Cross-Risk Analysis
Audit Reports (6)
MixBytes
Tier 2View reportSoftStack
View reportSoftStack
View reportHexens
View reportHexens
View reportHexens
View report