stHYPE
Tier 2sthype
Liquid StakingThe Hyperliquid liquid staking platform.
Security score
5.3/10
Research 29 Oct 2026 UTC
Known contract addresses
Not measured yet
Verified source available
Unknown
Measured lines of own deployed code
Not measured yet
Collected reports
15
Analysis Overview
Protocol Overview
Code Security
Economic Security
Team & Transparency
Governance
Cross-Analysis
Who controls
Research: 29 Oct 2026 UTC
Not measured
Recent control events
Not measured
Governance voting
Not measured
Audit coverage
Audit coverage data is not available for this research.
Loss cover
TVL at research time: $183,228,728.38
No loss-cover funds documented in this research.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary: Sthype
stHYPE is a liquid staking token for HYPE on Hyperliquid, with about USD 183M in TVL (money deposited), all on Hyperliquid L1. Its staking contracts have been reviewed by several audit firms, and no hack is recorded. The main concerns are team-held control, slow or discounted exits under stress, and no guaranteed loss cover. Most control and exit facts come from the protocol's own documentation (source reliability: unverified publisher), and no stHYPE contract on HyperEVM was read on-chain, so confidence is moderate to low.
Safety Rating
Overall Score: 5.3/10 Dimension scores: Code security 6.0 · Economic security 5.5 · Team transparency 3.5 · Governance 4.7 · Track record 6.1
- Code security
- 6.0 points
- Economic security
- 5.5 points
- Team transparency
- 3.5 points
- Governance
- 4.7 points
- Track record
- 6.1 points
The rating reflects strong audit activity on the staking contracts, held back by the fact that the audited code is in a private repository and cannot be matched to the deployed contracts. It also reflects an anonymous team and a multisig that cannot be checked on-chain.
Scores by Dimension
| Dimension | Key Finding |
|---|---|
| Code Security | Four firms reviewed the staking contracts, but the audited repository is private, so deployed code was not compared with it (a measurement gap, not a finding that the code differs) |
| Economic Security | Exits can be slow, no guaranteed insolvency backstop is documented, and holder concentration and DEX depth look weak on unverified, partly dated data |
| Team Transparency | No official team page names an accountable person; named founders and the Panama operating company rest on unverified publications |
| Governance | A multisig, not token voting, controls the protocol; the docs describe a 48-hour upgrade delay, but the official registry does not confirm the timelock ownership for the core proxies, and no delay is documented for role or parameter changes |
| Track Record | No incident is recorded, but evidence of behaviour under stress is weak and the operating history is short |
What This Protocol Does
stHYPE lets users deposit HYPE and receive stHYPE, a token that represents their stake and keeps earning staking rewards. Per the Valantis documentation, the protocol stakes the deposited HYPE on HyperCore (Hyperliquid's native layer) and also offers a trading-fee-discount product (Valantis Prime) and a restaking pool. These mechanics are Valantis's own descriptions from a documentation site whose publisher is not verified (source reliability: unverified publisher), and they are not independently confirmed. DeFiLlama records about USD 183.2M TVL (2026-10-29) for stHYPE on Hyperliquid L1 only. The STEX AMM and the wider Valantis AMM stack are separate Valantis products and are context only.
Key Strengths
- Audit depth on the staking contracts (stHYPE): seven reports from four firms over 20 months, with remediation reviews, and all critical and high findings fixed per the audits. Several of these audits sit on hosts not verified as auditor-controlled, which lowers confidence in provenance but not coverage credit. Audits of the older Valantis AMM products add nothing here.
- No leverage or rehypothecation in the core token (stHYPE): the docs say stake accounts can only stake to HyperCore. The docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) and a third-party review are the only sources, so this is unconfirmed by an independent source.
- Reduced admin power (stHYPE, wstHYPE): the docs say the admin's ability to block individual addresses was removed on 2026-04-10, and the docs describe a 48-hour upgrade timelock. Neither is confirmed on-chain, and the registry does not confirm the timelock for the core proxies.
- Rebase safety bounds (stHYPE): the code Pashov reviewed in October 2025 reverts the rebase on an excessive rate change or supply drop. Whether the deployed code has the same bounds is not established, because deployed code was not compared with the audited versions.
- Clean incident record: the DefiLlama hacks snapshot holds no records for the protocol or its family. An empty list does not prove none occurred.
Key Risks
- 1. Exit stress, delayed or discounted exits (stHYPE and wstHYPE holders). Magnitude: the delay applies to all USD 183M; likelihood: medium for a visible discount or queue delay, low for a prolonged freeze. If the instant-redemption queue empties, later exits depend on slower accounts. Unverified explorer data shows the top ten stHYPE holders owning about 90.7%, with unlabelled holders that may be contracts. Valantis Prime traders face a separate limit: per the docs (source reliability: unverified publisher), if the protocol ends a Prime account, balances stay inaccessible for at least seven days, with no guaranteed maximum duration. A Yearn risk report from May 2026 (source reliability: unverified publisher) puts DEX liquidity at about USD 6.95M; this is an unconfirmed figure.
- 2. Admin multisig compromise or misuse (stHYPE, wstHYPE,
OverseerV1, restaking escrow). Magnitude: up to the full USD 183M in the worst case; likelihood: low. Four of six unnamed signers can change roles and parameters, and upgrade after the documented 48-hour delay (not confirmed for the core proxies). Holders have no veto, and a full exit can take longer than the delay. The threshold, signers and timelock are documentation statements and are not confirmed on-chain for HyperEVM. - 3. Slashing, deployer exposure and socialised losses (stHYPE, wstHYPE, restaked positions). Magnitude: bounded by stake in the affected accounts, which is not measured; likelihood: low. For HIP-3 deployers (builder-deployed perpetual markets), penalties can reach the entire stake. Which HIP-3 or HIP-4 rules apply to the only active deployer account, the USDe quote-asset module, is not established, and base-staking slashing was not yet enabled at Pashov's October 2025 review. Slashed HYPE is burned, with no guaranteed backstop. A Staking Rewards review (source reliability: unverified publisher) reports the treasury at under 0.25% of TVL; this is unconfirmed.
- Single-keeper pause on the restaking escrow (restakers in
StakedHypeEscrow). Magnitude: moderate, limited to restaked funds, whose size is not measured; likelihood: low. The docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) say one keeper holdingMANAGER_ROLEcan callsetPaused, which blocks deposits, requests, cancellations and execution with no maximum duration. Restakers cannot exit while the pause lasts. This is an unconfirmed report, and the escrow audit does not mention the pause. - DeFi integration risks (wstHYPE borrowers, lenders and integrators outside this record): the docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) warn that the dual-token model (stHYPE and wstHYPE) introduces a significant vulnerability for certain DeFi integrations and say mitigation is simple. The reports do not establish the mechanism or the affected integrations, report no exploit, and do not link this warning to the liquidation scenario below. Separately, liquidation stress for wstHYPE collateral: a Yearn risk report from May 2026 (source reliability: unverified publisher) counts about USD 65M of wstHYPE used as collateral against about USD 690K of wstHYPE DEX liquidity. These are unconfirmed, five-month-old figures, and the lender data is not in the sources.
Critical Findings
No critical findings identified. One high-severity item is open, but it concerns the separate Valantis HOT AMM product, not stHYPE: the signer is a single point of failure, a High (estimated, an AI estimate; the audit states no rating), acknowledged by the team. Two high findings on the staking contracts (Guardian, November 2025 and January 2026) are fixed per the audits and were not re-checked.
- Two medium findings on the stHYPE
Overseerfrom the Guardian review of 2026-01-05 are acknowledged, not fixed. One saysgetTotalBalanceleaves out a deprecated interim address, which can cause false slashing or block mint and redeem. The other, "Min Slash Threshold Skews Losses", means small slash losses fall on current holders. The audited repository code was not available, so these were not checked against code.
Recommendation
Assessment: stHYPE suits risk-tolerant HYPE holders who accept team-held control, slow exits under stress and no guaranteed loss cover in return for staking yield. This is a judgement based on the findings cited below, not a recommendation made by the worker reports. The audit record on the staking contracts is a real strength. The weak points are an anonymous team, a multisig that cannot be checked on-chain, and thin secondary liquidity. Assessment: users with low risk tolerance, or who may need to exit large amounts quickly, should wait until the multisig, timelock and roles are confirmed on-chain and the audited code is tied to the deployed contracts (the audited repository is private, so this is a measurement gap, not a finding that the code differs), because the cross-risk report lists these as missing facts. Looped wstHYPE positions in lending markets carry extra liquidation risk.
Report Sections
- Protocol Overview
- Code Security
- Economic Security
- Social & Team
- Governance
- Cross-Risk Analysis
Audit Reports (15)
Sherlock
Community auditView reportWatchPug
View reportStatemind
Tier 2View reportObsidian
View reportUnknown auditor
View reportObsidian
View reportThree Sigma
View reportStatemind
Tier 2View reportStatemind
Tier 2View reportGuardianAudits
View reportGuardianAudits
View reportPashov Audit Group
Tier 2View reportPashov Audit Group
Tier 2View reportHexens
View reportHexens
View report