stHYPE logo

stHYPE

Tier 2

sthype

Liquid Staking
Hyperliquid L1

The Hyperliquid liquid staking platform.

TVL

$183.23M

DeFiLlama
Updated 29 Oct 2026 UTC

Security score

5.3/10

Research 29 Oct 2026 UTC

Known contract addresses

Not measured yet

Verified source available

Unknown

Measured lines of own deployed code

Not measured yet

Collected reports

15

Analysis Overview

🏗️

Protocol Overview

stHYPE is a liquid staking token for HYPE on Hyperliquid: users deposit HYPE and receive stHYPE, while the protocol stakes the deposited HYPE on HyperCore. About $183M TVL sits on one chain, alongside wstHYPE, optional restaking and Valantis Prime accounts. Main risks are slashing, slow exits under stress, a team-run multisig with no holder veto, and no guaranteed insolvency backstop. Controls come from the team's unverified docs and were not read on-chain; the audited code is private, so it was not compared with the deployed contracts.
How it works →
🔒

Code Security

6.0/10
Seven reports by four firms (Three Sigma, Pashov, Guardian, Obsidian) reviewed the staking contracts from 2025-02 to 2026-10, with no critical findings and the high ones fixed; several sit on hosts not verified as the auditor's, so confidence is lower. Two acknowledged medium issues on the Overseer contract could block minting or redemption and push small slash losses onto current holders. The audited code is private, so it is not compared with deployed contracts. Bug bounty status is unclear: the docs say none runs for stHYPE, while one is listed for the related STEX product.
💰

Economic Security

5.5/10
stHYPE has no market price feed for minting or redeeming; yield comes from HyperCore staking rewards. Slashing losses are shared by all holders and could trigger liquidations in lending markets holding wstHYPE, though the active deployer module's slashing exposure is not established. Other risks: slow exits (about 7 days normally, 30 to 183 days for deployer-held stake per the docs), no guaranteed insolvency backstop, and thin DEX depth. Reported top-10 holder concentration (about 90.7%) is uncertain, as addresses are unlabelled; depth data dates from May 2026 and is unverified.
👥

Team & Transparency

3.5/10
stHYPE is run by Valantis Labs. Unverified publishers list several people as co-founders or CTO, and a Panama-registered company, but profile titles differ and no official team page confirms any of them, so identity stays unconfirmed. Public work dates from early 2024, and no hack is recorded. The team is reportedly small, about six people, and the docs say no bug bounty runs for stHYPE. Confidence in identity and track record is low.
🗳️

Governance

4.7/10
stHYPE is controlled by a 4-of-6 multisig, not token voting, and holders have no veto. The docs state a 48-hour delay on proxy upgrades, but the official registry does not confirm timelock ownership for the core proxies (only for the restaking escrow) and lists no delay for role grants or parameter changes. Signer identities are undisclosed, and the restaking escrow can be paused with no maximum duration. These controls come from the protocol's own docs and are not confirmed on-chain.
🔗

Cross-Analysis

No hack is recorded, but risks compound. Reported holder concentration and thin DEX depth (both from unverified, partly dated data) meet slow exits, a team-run multisig and no insolvency backstop. The likeliest holder loss is a discounted or delayed exit under stress. The worst case is multisig compromise, since role changes have no documented delay. A slash could also cascade through wstHYPE lending positions. Confidence is moderate to low because the controls are docs-only.

Who controls

Research: 29 Oct 2026 UTC

Not measured

Recent control events

Not measured

Governance voting

Not measured

Audit coverage

Audit coverage data is not available for this research.

Loss cover

TVL at research time: $183,228,728.38

No loss-cover funds documented in this research.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary: Sthype

stHYPE is a liquid staking token for HYPE on Hyperliquid, with about USD 183M in TVL (money deposited), all on Hyperliquid L1. Its staking contracts have been reviewed by several audit firms, and no hack is recorded. The main concerns are team-held control, slow or discounted exits under stress, and no guaranteed loss cover. Most control and exit facts come from the protocol's own documentation (source reliability: unverified publisher), and no stHYPE contract on HyperEVM was read on-chain, so confidence is moderate to low.

Safety Rating

Overall Score: 5.3/10 Dimension scores: Code security 6.0 · Economic security 5.5 · Team transparency 3.5 · Governance 4.7 · Track record 6.1

Scores by dimension, points out of 10 (points)
Code security
6.0 points
Economic security
5.5 points
Team transparency
3.5 points
Governance
4.7 points
Track record
6.1 points

The rating reflects strong audit activity on the staking contracts, held back by the fact that the audited code is in a private repository and cannot be matched to the deployed contracts. It also reflects an anonymous team and a multisig that cannot be checked on-chain.

Scores by Dimension

DimensionKey Finding
Code SecurityFour firms reviewed the staking contracts, but the audited repository is private, so deployed code was not compared with it (a measurement gap, not a finding that the code differs)
Economic SecurityExits can be slow, no guaranteed insolvency backstop is documented, and holder concentration and DEX depth look weak on unverified, partly dated data
Team TransparencyNo official team page names an accountable person; named founders and the Panama operating company rest on unverified publications
GovernanceA multisig, not token voting, controls the protocol; the docs describe a 48-hour upgrade delay, but the official registry does not confirm the timelock ownership for the core proxies, and no delay is documented for role or parameter changes
Track RecordNo incident is recorded, but evidence of behaviour under stress is weak and the operating history is short

What This Protocol Does

stHYPE lets users deposit HYPE and receive stHYPE, a token that represents their stake and keeps earning staking rewards. Per the Valantis documentation, the protocol stakes the deposited HYPE on HyperCore (Hyperliquid's native layer) and also offers a trading-fee-discount product (Valantis Prime) and a restaking pool. These mechanics are Valantis's own descriptions from a documentation site whose publisher is not verified (source reliability: unverified publisher), and they are not independently confirmed. DeFiLlama records about USD 183.2M TVL (2026-10-29) for stHYPE on Hyperliquid L1 only. The STEX AMM and the wider Valantis AMM stack are separate Valantis products and are context only.

Key Strengths

  • Audit depth on the staking contracts (stHYPE): seven reports from four firms over 20 months, with remediation reviews, and all critical and high findings fixed per the audits. Several of these audits sit on hosts not verified as auditor-controlled, which lowers confidence in provenance but not coverage credit. Audits of the older Valantis AMM products add nothing here.
  • No leverage or rehypothecation in the core token (stHYPE): the docs say stake accounts can only stake to HyperCore. The docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) and a third-party review are the only sources, so this is unconfirmed by an independent source.
  • Reduced admin power (stHYPE, wstHYPE): the docs say the admin's ability to block individual addresses was removed on 2026-04-10, and the docs describe a 48-hour upgrade timelock. Neither is confirmed on-chain, and the registry does not confirm the timelock for the core proxies.
  • Rebase safety bounds (stHYPE): the code Pashov reviewed in October 2025 reverts the rebase on an excessive rate change or supply drop. Whether the deployed code has the same bounds is not established, because deployed code was not compared with the audited versions.
  • Clean incident record: the DefiLlama hacks snapshot holds no records for the protocol or its family. An empty list does not prove none occurred.

Key Risks

  • 1. Exit stress, delayed or discounted exits (stHYPE and wstHYPE holders). Magnitude: the delay applies to all USD 183M; likelihood: medium for a visible discount or queue delay, low for a prolonged freeze. If the instant-redemption queue empties, later exits depend on slower accounts. Unverified explorer data shows the top ten stHYPE holders owning about 90.7%, with unlabelled holders that may be contracts. Valantis Prime traders face a separate limit: per the docs (source reliability: unverified publisher), if the protocol ends a Prime account, balances stay inaccessible for at least seven days, with no guaranteed maximum duration. A Yearn risk report from May 2026 (source reliability: unverified publisher) puts DEX liquidity at about USD 6.95M; this is an unconfirmed figure.
  • 2. Admin multisig compromise or misuse (stHYPE, wstHYPE, OverseerV1, restaking escrow). Magnitude: up to the full USD 183M in the worst case; likelihood: low. Four of six unnamed signers can change roles and parameters, and upgrade after the documented 48-hour delay (not confirmed for the core proxies). Holders have no veto, and a full exit can take longer than the delay. The threshold, signers and timelock are documentation statements and are not confirmed on-chain for HyperEVM.
  • 3. Slashing, deployer exposure and socialised losses (stHYPE, wstHYPE, restaked positions). Magnitude: bounded by stake in the affected accounts, which is not measured; likelihood: low. For HIP-3 deployers (builder-deployed perpetual markets), penalties can reach the entire stake. Which HIP-3 or HIP-4 rules apply to the only active deployer account, the USDe quote-asset module, is not established, and base-staking slashing was not yet enabled at Pashov's October 2025 review. Slashed HYPE is burned, with no guaranteed backstop. A Staking Rewards review (source reliability: unverified publisher) reports the treasury at under 0.25% of TVL; this is unconfirmed.
  • Single-keeper pause on the restaking escrow (restakers in StakedHypeEscrow). Magnitude: moderate, limited to restaked funds, whose size is not measured; likelihood: low. The docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) say one keeper holding MANAGER_ROLE can call setPaused, which blocks deposits, requests, cancellations and execution with no maximum duration. Restakers cannot exit while the pause lasts. This is an unconfirmed report, and the escrow audit does not mention the pause.
  • DeFi integration risks (wstHYPE borrowers, lenders and integrators outside this record): the docs (source reliability: unverified publisher) warn that the dual-token model (stHYPE and wstHYPE) introduces a significant vulnerability for certain DeFi integrations and say mitigation is simple. The reports do not establish the mechanism or the affected integrations, report no exploit, and do not link this warning to the liquidation scenario below. Separately, liquidation stress for wstHYPE collateral: a Yearn risk report from May 2026 (source reliability: unverified publisher) counts about USD 65M of wstHYPE used as collateral against about USD 690K of wstHYPE DEX liquidity. These are unconfirmed, five-month-old figures, and the lender data is not in the sources.

Critical Findings

No critical findings identified. One high-severity item is open, but it concerns the separate Valantis HOT AMM product, not stHYPE: the signer is a single point of failure, a High (estimated, an AI estimate; the audit states no rating), acknowledged by the team. Two high findings on the staking contracts (Guardian, November 2025 and January 2026) are fixed per the audits and were not re-checked.

  • Two medium findings on the stHYPE Overseer from the Guardian review of 2026-01-05 are acknowledged, not fixed. One says getTotalBalance leaves out a deprecated interim address, which can cause false slashing or block mint and redeem. The other, "Min Slash Threshold Skews Losses", means small slash losses fall on current holders. The audited repository code was not available, so these were not checked against code.

Recommendation

Assessment: stHYPE suits risk-tolerant HYPE holders who accept team-held control, slow exits under stress and no guaranteed loss cover in return for staking yield. This is a judgement based on the findings cited below, not a recommendation made by the worker reports. The audit record on the staking contracts is a real strength. The weak points are an anonymous team, a multisig that cannot be checked on-chain, and thin secondary liquidity. Assessment: users with low risk tolerance, or who may need to exit large amounts quickly, should wait until the multisig, timelock and roles are confirmed on-chain and the audited code is tied to the deployed contracts (the audited repository is private, so this is a measurement gap, not a finding that the code differs), because the cross-risk report lists these as missing facts. Looped wstHYPE positions in lending markets carry extra liquidation risk.

Report Sections

  • Protocol Overview
  • Code Security
  • Economic Security
  • Social & Team
  • Governance
  • Cross-Risk Analysis

Audit Reports (15)

Preview3 · Default / Rows