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Rocket Pool

TierΒ 1

rocket-pool

Liquid Staking
Ethereum

Rocket Pool is the first truly decentralised Ethereum staking pool. Liquid Staking, Audited SC, and Minimised Penalty Risk. Unlike solo stakers, who are required to put 32 ETH up for deposit to create a new validator, Rocket Pool nodes only need to deposit 16 ETH per validator. This will be coupled with 16 ETH from the staking pool (which stakers deposited in exchange for rETH) to create a new ETH2 validator.

TVL

$1.11B

DeFiLlama
Updated 02 Nov 2026 UTC

Security score

5.0/10

Research 29 Oct 2026 UTC

Known contract addresses

Not measured yet

Verified source available

Unknown

Measured lines of own deployed code

Not measured yet

Collected reports

19

Analysis Overview

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Protocol Overview

Rocket Pool is an Ethereum liquid staking protocol: users stake ETH and receive rETH, which rises in value against ETH as rewards accrue, apart from losses, and node operators run validators with a 4 ETH bond per megapool validator (older minipools required more). RPL is the governance and collateral token. DeFiLlama recorded about USD 1.12bn of TVL, all on Ethereum, on 2026-10-29. Main risks: the newest megapool code (live since 2026-02-18), a trusted ten-member oracle committee reporting the rETH rate, and a small direct-redemption buffer.
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Code Security

4.3/10
Rocket Pool has deep audit history, including four Saturn upgrade reviews in January to February 2026. Only Hashlock's is on the auditor's own site; the Cantina, Bailsec and Sigma Prime copies are project-hosted with unverified provenance, so they carry lower confidence. Deployed code was not compared with any audited version. Of 458 distinct findings, 235 are marked fixed and 52 critical, high or medium ones are not marked fixed; Bailsec could not rule out remaining critical issues. One model observation (hypothesis, informational) notes the guardian is a single key.
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Economic Security

5.3/10
rETH returns come from Ethereum staking rewards, and megapool node operators' 4 ETH bonds absorb the first losses. Weak points: a ten-member oracle committee pushes the rETH rate, only about 0.73% of supply can be redeemed directly, DEX depth was not measured, and no insurance or reserve fund was found. If an operator misses an exit notice and the Oracle DAO does not challenge, principal can be paid out as rewards; no shortfall is recorded. Who bears losses above the 4 ETH bond is unconfirmed.
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Team & Transparency

5.7/10
The team is publicly named, including founder David Rugendyke and general manager Darren Langley, and the protocol has run on mainnet since 2021-11-09 with audits and proposals published. The one recorded incident is a 2023 phishing loss of about USD 3.8M; weak sources point to an individual holder's wallet, but no first-party statement confirms this. Gaps include the company's legal jurisdiction, commit activity and treasury reporting.
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Governance

3.5/10
Two on-chain DAOs govern the protocol: RPL holders vote on settings, and an Oracle DAO proposes upgrades, with a documented one-week delay and a Security Council veto. That council's only member was a team-run multisig as of January 2026, and current signers are unconfirmed. The guardian is a single key with no-delay control over its own role, and its other powers were not resolved. On-chain delays and voter concentration were also not confirmed, so the weak result reflects missing data more than a measured flaw.
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Cross-Analysis

The main combined risk is exiting: only about 0.73% of rETH supply can be redeemed directly, DEX depth was not measured, and an unconfirmed report from an unverified publisher says a key liquidity venue is winding down (stress discount: medium likelihood). Staker ETH could also be lost through a Saturn 1 bug (contracts not matched to audits) or a validator loss above the 4 ETH operator bond, whose allocation is unconfirmed (low to medium). Low-likelihood paths: a missed exit notice plus a missed Oracle DAO challenge treating principal as rewards, and trusted control of the rate and upgrades.

Who controls

Research: 29 Oct 2026 UTC

Not measured

Recent control events

Not measured

Governance voting

Not measured

Audit coverage

Audit coverage data is not available for this research.

Loss cover

TVL at research time: $1,118,047,553.40

No loss-cover funds documented in this research.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary: Rocket Pool

Rocket Pool is a mature Ethereum liquid staking protocol (about USD 1.12bn of value locked, all on Ethereum) with a named team and a long audit history. The cross-analysis rates the composite risk as moderate, with a few named combined risks. Direct rETH exits go through a very small buffer, the newest upgrade (Saturn 1) has not been tied to its audits, trusted committees control the rETH rate and contract upgrades, and several live settings were not read on-chain. Evidence is strong on how the protocol works and weaker on live admin settings, so the governance picture is incomplete rather than proven bad.

Safety Rating

Overall Score: 5.0/10 Dimension scores: Code security 4.3 Β· Economic security 5.3 Β· Team transparency 5.7 Β· Governance 3.5 Β· Track record 6.7

Scores by dimension, points out of 10 (points)
Code security
4.3 points
Economic security
5.3 points
Team transparency
5.7 points
Governance
3.5 points
Track record
6.7 points

Governance has a low score mainly because key facts were not read on-chain (upgrade delay, Security Council signers, guardian powers, voter concentration). The cross-analysis says the governance score reflects missing data more than a measured weakness . The cross-analysis puts overall confidence at moderate .

Scores by Dimension

DimensionKey Finding
Code SecurityFour independent firms reviewed the Saturn upgrade, but live code was never compared with any audited version.
Economic SecurityrETH earns staking rewards and operators take first losses, but the rate comes from a ten-member oracle committee and direct-exit liquidity is under 1% of supply.
Team TransparencyThe founder, general manager and company are named; the company's jurisdiction and treasury reporting are not in the sources.
GovernanceTwo on-chain DAOs plus a Security Council veto, but the guardian is a single key and council signers and voter concentration are unconfirmed.
Track RecordLive on Ethereum since 2021-11-09 with several upgrades delivered; one recorded 2023 phishing loss of about USD 3.8M, whose victim no first-party source confirms.

What This Protocol Does

Rocket Pool lets anyone stake ETH through a decentralised network of node operators and receive rETH, a liquid receipt token that grows in value against ETH. The products in scope are the rETH token, the RPL governance and collateral token, the node-operator system (minipools and the newer megapools) and the two DAOs that govern it. DefiLlama records TVL on Ethereum only; no inactive chains were reported in the worker reports.

Key Strengths

  • Review depth on the Saturn 1 upgrade. Hashlock (January 2026), Bailsec, Cantina and Sigma Prime reviewed it. Hashlock's verified scope covers megapool, deposit, node, token and network contract paths, and its one Medium finding is marked resolved . The audit index could not confirm the scope of the Sigma Prime Saturn review or the Bailsec report . Several of those copies are project-hosted with unverified provenance, which lowers confidence but not the credit.
  • Fixed findings. Of 458 distinct audit findings, 235 are marked fixed, including 9 of 11 critical groups.
  • Operators take losses first (megapool validators). Operators bond 4 ETH per validator and absorb losses up to that amount.
  • Organic rETH yield. rETH returns come from Beacon Chain, fee and MEV rewards, not token emissions.
  • Public, named team and open governance process. Every change starts as a public proposal. The official process page lists a one-week upgrade delay and a Security Council veto with a 33% quorum . The live upgrade.delay was not read on-chain, and the team's January 2026 statement gives a 2-week minimum, so the delay is not confirmed .

Key Risks

  1. rETH exit discount under stress (rETH holders). Magnitude: unknown, because DEX depth was not measured. Likelihood: medium (assessment). The rETH contract and deposit pool hold about 2,646 ETH of collateral, a collateral rate of 0.73%, against supply worth about 362,000 ETH. If sellers outnumber DEX liquidity, rETH could trade below its protocol rate. A community forum post (source reliability: community publication) says mainnet rETH liquidity fell from over USD 30M to about USD 2.5M; this is an unconfirmed lead. A captured Balancer page (source reliability: unverified publisher) says most pools move to withdrawals only on 30 October 2026, which could close a main exit venue; this is also an unconfirmed lead. In an exploit scare the Security Council can act instantly only with pause-type powers, and the sources describe no global pause.
  2. Loss of staker ETH through Saturn 1 bugs, or a loss above the 4 ETH bond (rETH, megapool operators). Magnitude: severe in the worst case, not sized in USD. Likelihood: low to medium. Bailsec cannot state with high confidence that no critical issues remain. The docs do not say who absorbs a loss above the bond. A separate conditional path is megapool exit accounting: if the node operator fails to notify an exit and the Oracle DAO fails to challenge in time, distribute treats principal as rewards. The team classes this as intended behavior and relies on the challenge process, which also fines the operator, and no realised shortfall is recorded. No insurance or reserve fund was found, and the Immunefi bounty maximum is USD 150,000.
  3. Trusted-key control of the rETH rate and of upgrades, plus adjustable RPL rewards (rETH, RPL stakers, node operators). Magnitude: about 7,200 ETH per 2% rate error; a malicious upgrade could in principle reach the whole TVL. Likelihood: low for key-control events. In practice 6 of 10 oracle members must agree on the rate. An upgrade can replace any registered contract, including those holding ETH. The live rate limit was not read on-chain. RPL staker rewards depend on adjustable splits and on inflation planned to phase out with Saturn 2. Assessment: a change to RPL staker rewards is likely over time, because the documented plan phases out the inflation rewards . The exposed reward stream is smaller than total issuance and its size is a gap .
  4. Unmatched audits and unfixed older findings. The 52 critical, high or medium findings not marked fixed include two 2021 critical groups on deployment-phase powers. The audit coverage table shows deployed code was not compared with the audited version; this is "not compared", not a measured mismatch.
  5. Single-key guardian. The guardian address read from RocketStorage has no contract code, so it is a single key with zero-delay setGuardian. Its other remaining powers are unresolved. A related model observation is published only as a hypothesis, informational.

Critical Findings

  • No confirmed critical exploit is reported. Two 2021 ConsenSys Diligence critical findings are not marked fixed: DAO takeover during deployment and open settings until the contract is declared deployed . The audited code revision was not available to check them against code. The on-chain registry now reports the deployment phase as finished, which closes the settings window only . Whether the DAO-takeover issue still matters depends on guardian powers that were not traced .
  • The Bailsec review of Saturn reports 144 findings including 26 High, and a follow-up commit still had fund-theft and DoS issues. These are audit findings, not confirmed live exploits.
  • The team said in January 2026 that the Security Council's only member is a multisig of three team members. The current owners behind the council contract are not identified on-chain, so that composition is not confirmed.

Documented vs On-Chain

  • The oracle committee: Exponential says consensus needs 9 of 16 members. On-chain at Ethereum block 26294960 (2026-10-29) the committee has 10 members and a vote quorum of 5.1.
  • Redemption buffer: the Saturn 1 docs describe a 1% buffer and Sigma Prime refers to a 10% buffer; on-chain at block 26294960 the collateral rate is 0.73%.
  • Upgrade delay: governance cites a one-week delay and the team's January 2026 "2 weeks" minimum; the live value was not read on-chain and is not confirmed.
  • Security Council: the team (January 2026) says the member is a multisig of three team members; the on-chain read of a contract with threshold 2 and three owners does not show whether those owners are the team members.

Recommendation

Rocket Pool suits users who accept staking-protocol risk and can hold rETH through a possible short-term discount. Its yield is organic, its team is public, and the Saturn 1 code had four independent reviews. Large holders should size positions against the thin direct-exit buffer. Holders beyond the 0.73% buffer would need DEX liquidity, whose depth was not measured, or validator exits. No check of the audits or governance settings would establish a fast exit. A measured 2% price-impact depth across venues would help assess the exit-discount risk , but no maximum delay is stated for validator exits . Separately, users who want proof that live contracts match audits, or confidence in the upgrade controls, should wait for a deployed-code comparison, a read of the live upgrade delay and rate limit, and identification of the Security Council owners.

Report Sections

  • Protocol Overview
  • Code Security
  • Economic Security
  • Social & Team
  • Governance
  • Cross-Risk Analysis

Audit Reports (19)

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