Benqi Staked Avax
Tier 2benqi-staked-avax
Liquid StakingStake AVAX on BENQI's Liquid Staking Protocol and freely utilize it within powerful Decentralized Financial applications.
Security score
4.9/10
Research 30 Oct 2026 UTC
Known contract addresses
Not measured yet
Verified source available
Unknown
Measured lines of own deployed code
1,331
Collected reports
9
Analysis Overview
Protocol Overview
Code Security
Economic Security
Team & Transparency
Governance
Cross-Analysis
Who controls
Research: 30 Oct 2026 UTC
Not measured
Recent control events
Not measured
Governance voting
Not measured
Audit coverage
Audit coverage could not be verified
Measured lines: 1,331 · Measured files: 3
Audited commits not found publicly
Unmeasured files: 0 · Unmeasured components: 0
See audits and sourcesLoss cover
TVL at research time: $200,546,865.86
No loss-cover funds documented in this research.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary: Benqi Staked Avax
Benqi Staked Avax is a single-product, single-chain liquid staking pool on Avalanche, and no hack is recorded for it. Its weak point is control: a few keys and multisigs can upgrade the contract, pause it or move pooled AVAX instantly, and no timelock was found. The contract logic has been reviewed by two audit firms, but the audited code was not compared with the deployed code. Confidence is good on the on-chain control facts and weaker on liquidity depth, signer identities and off-chain custody.
Safety Rating
Overall Score: 4.9/10 Dimension scores: Code security 6.0 · Economic security 3.8 · Team transparency 4.0 · Governance 1.6 · Track record 8.6
- Code security
- 6.0 points
- Economic security
- 3.8 points
- Team transparency
- 4.0 points
- Governance
- 1.6 points
- Track record
- 8.6 points
The weak scores come from governance and economics, not from known coding flaws.
Scores by Dimension
| Dimension | Key Finding |
|---|---|
| Code Security | Two firms and formal verification reviewed StakedAvax, but the audited revision is not tied to the deployed code. |
| Economic Security | Custody and control are the main weakness; no insurance fund, slashing rule or proof of reserves is shown. |
| Team Transparency | Official documents name no team members, and weak sources give conflicting founder lists. |
| Governance | Multisigs and single keys act with zero delay; the signers of the 4-of-6 upgrade Safe are not identified by any source. |
| Track Record | No hack is recorded for the product or its family; a May 2026 event in a sibling lending market is covered only by weak sources. |
What This Protocol Does
BENQI Staked AVAX lets users deposit AVAX, the Avalanche network's native coin, and receive sAVAX in return. sAVAX is a "liquid staking" receipt token: the AVAX is delegated to validators, and staking rewards raise the value of each sAVAX over time. The DefiLlama record covers this one product on Avalanche, with TVL of about USD 200.5M. BENQI lending markets, Ignite and the QI token are other products and are context only.
Documented vs On-Chain
- A BENQI post in an Aave governance thread (2022-05-03; source reliability: community publication) says the sAVAX token "is currently held in a 4/7 multisig by the team" and that the multisig would expand to 10 signers. On Avalanche at block 98915447 (2026-10-30) the upgrade Safe is 4-of-6. Whether any current signer is outside the team is not confirmed.
- The published
StakedAvax.soldocumentation copy is older than the deployed contract. It hasaccrueRewards(uint amount), while the deployed contract at block 98915447 showsaccrueRewards(). Mechanics taken only from that copy are not confirmed for the deployed version. - The Immunefi bounty scope names the rewards contract "sAVAX reward timelock". On-chain at block 98915447 (2026-10-30) its proxy admin is owned by a single address with no code, and the upgrade delay is 0. The contract's own internal delay was not measured.
- A 2022 BENQI post in the same Aave thread (source reliability: community publication) said the delegating account was "in the process of being transitioned" to an MPC (multi-party computation) model. On-chain at block 98915447 the withdraw role is held by one address with no code, and whether it is MPC-controlled is not documented.
Key Strengths
- Audit review of
StakedAvax(sAVAX product only): Halborn's four critical findings are marked fixed in the ledger. Seven of the nine audit files sit on a host not verified as auditor-controlled, which lowers confidence in claims that rest only on them. Audits of lending, Ignite and oracle products are not counted for sAVAX. - Across all nine audit files (several cover other BENQI products), only two finding groups are critical, high or medium and not fixed. For
sAVAX, all critical and high findings are fixed except the Certora admin-trust item described under Critical Findings. The other open group is an acknowledged medium on the BENQI lending protocol, a different product. - The 15-day cooldown and 2-day redeem window are confirmed on-chain at block 98915447 and match the documentation.
- An Immunefi bug bounty is live. Sourcify, a code-matching provider, reports a runtime match for the proxy. This is not independent assurance of the code or of audit-to-deployment equivalence. The bounty excludes centralization and privileged-address impacts, so it does not cover the admin-trust risk below.
- The product is live since 2022-02-17 with no record in the hacks dataset.
Key Risks
- Key or signer compromise at the custody and upgrade layer (all
sAVAXholders). One address with no code holdswithdraw, and a 4-of-6 Safe can upgrade the contract, both with a 0-second delay. Magnitude: a withdraw-key loss exposes the AVAX in the contract at that moment, which was not measured ; an upgrade-Safe compromise reaches the same balance plus later deposits, so exposure grows with deposits . The sources do not show that an upgrade alone reaches delegated AVAX. The pool today is 24,097,137 AVAX, about USD 200.5M of TVL in the current snapshot. It is not established exposure, and it bounds today's pool, not future deposits. Likelihood: low. - Frozen or slowed exit with a possible depeg and possible lending-market liquidations (
sAVAXholders and anyone using it as collateral). Redemption takes 15 days plus a 2-day window, and the Safe can change both instantly. Magnitude: temporary loss of liquidity for the whole pool ; realised losses fall on sellers, and on borrowers only if their positions are liquidated . Whether liquidations follow depends on borrower positions and market rules, which are not established ; the size of a discount is unknown because no depeg history is measured . Likelihood: low to medium for a temporary discount in a sharp AVAX sell-off , lower for the liquidation part because borrower positions and market rules are unknown , and low for a deliberate multi-week freeze, since it needs signer misconduct . No depeg or liquidation event is measured. The pool-depth and holder figures behind this come from an unverified publisher (source reliability: unverified publisher). - Backing and exchange rate that holders cannot verify (all
sAVAXholders). If delegated AVAX is lost, the rate can stay unchanged until the gap shows at redemption. Magnitude: an unknown share of pooled AVAX, because the delegated share is not quantified. Likelihood: low. - Upgrade-Safe takeover inside the exit window. A holder who has not yet completed the 15-day cooldown cannot redeem through the protocol before an instant upgrade takes effect, and their only faster exit is an AMM sale. A holder already inside the 2-day redeem window could still redeem first, if the contract holds enough liquid AVAX, and the size of that group is not measured. The cross-analysis rates the likelihood low and the impact severe; delegated P-Chain AVAX is not shown to be reachable by an upgrade alone.
- Rewards contract that feeds the exchange rate has weaker upgrade control than the Safe. Its upgrade control is a single code-less address with a 0-second delay, and the contract's own delay was not measured.
Critical Findings
- No unresolved critical finding is reported for
sAVAX; the only open critical-or-high item is the one below. - One open item is rated High (estimated), because the audit states no rating: the Certora audit (2022) treats the admin role as fully trusted, with unrestricted deposit and withdraw. The report calls it the largest code-level trust risk in the product.
- Deployed code vs audits: the comparison was not performed ("not compared"), because the exact audited revisions are not public. This is an evidence gap, not a finding of changed or unaudited code.
Recommendation
This protocol suits risk-tolerant users who accept trust in a small group of operators and signers, hold AVAX exposure anyway, and can wait out a 15-day exit. Users with low risk tolerance, or those who plan to use sAVAX as leveraged collateral, should wait for evidence of a timelock, named signers and independent proof of the staked balance. The reasons are that control sits with instant-acting keys and multisigs and that custody is off-chain and unverifiable, with no recorded loss to date.
Report Sections
- Protocol Overview
- Code Security
- Economic Security
- Social & Team
- Governance
- Cross-Risk Analysis
Audit Reports (9)
HALBORN
Tier 2View reportUnknown auditor
View reportUnknown auditor
View reportCyfrin
Tier 1View reportUnknown auditor
View reportUnknown auditor
View reportHALBORN
Tier 2View reportZellic
Tier 2View reportHALBORN
Tier 2View report