Aura
Tier 4aura
YieldAura Finance is a protocol built on top of the Balancer system to provide maximum incentives to Balancer liquidity providers and BAL stakers (into veBAL) through social aggregation of BAL deposits and Aura's native token.
Security score
5.7/10
Research 28 Oct 2026 UTC
Known contract addresses
Not measured yet
Verified source available
Unknown
Measured lines of own deployed code
35,876
Collected reports
11
Analysis Overview
Protocol Overview
Code Security
Economic Security
Team & Transparency
Governance
Cross-Analysis
Who controls
Research: 28 Oct 2026 UTC
Not measured
Recent control events
Not measured
Governance voting
Not measured
Audit coverage
Audit coverage could not be verified
Measured lines: 35,876 · Measured files: 185
Unmeasured files: 0 · Unmeasured components: 11
See audits and sourcesLoss cover
TVL at research time: $9,706,305.83
No loss-cover funds documented in this research.
Executive Summary
Executive Summary: Aura
Aura is a closing protocol. Its pools accept withdrawals only, and AURA and auraBAL holders redeem in stages through 2027-05-10. The main risks for a holder are getting value out, not earning yield. No exploit of Aura is recorded, but no audit of the redemption path is in the sources, deployed code was never compared with any audited version, and the people running the admin keys are not named. Confidence is moderate.
Safety Rating
Overall Score: 5.7/10 Dimension scores: Code security 5.9 · Economic security 4.5 · Team transparency 6.2 · Governance 3.7 · Track record 8.6
- Code security
- 5.9 points
- Economic security
- 4.5 points
- Team transparency
- 6.2 points
- Governance
- 3.7 points
- Track record
- 8.6 points
Aura is winding down, so the rating reflects exit risk more than yield risk. Two score caps apply in principle: one because audit scope could not be linked to the deployed contracts, and one because core economic facts are unknown. Neither cap is binding on the displayed scores. The scores come from the worker reports and are not changed here.
Scores by Dimension
| Dimension | Key Finding |
|---|---|
| Code Security | Both high findings are fixed and 21 of 28 medium findings are fixed (two of the 28 are medium (estimated): an AI estimate, because that report states no rating), but audits were not linked to the deployed code. |
| Economic Security | Aura is in a governance-approved wind-down. auraBAL holders wait until 2027-05-10, and evidence on liquidity, oracles and loss cover is thin. |
| Team Transparency | A legal entity is named for the website only, and no individual team member is named. |
| Governance | A 4-of-7 Safe (multisig wallet) holds owner powers with a measured delay of zero, and the link between Snapshot votes and the Safe is unconfirmed. |
| Track Record | Aura ran from mid-2022 with no recorded exploit of its own contracts, but no complete outage or pause history exists. |
What This Protocol Does
Aura let holders of Balancer liquidity-provider tokens or BAL tokens hand them to Aura and earn boosted rewards without managing Balancer's long veBAL lock themselves. It is now ending: the official site says pools are withdrawal-only. DeFiLlama shows about USD 9.7M of remaining deposits, all on Ethereum.
Documented vs On-Chain
- The official sunset page says the final stage is "in 6 months". That wording is stale against the 2026-10-28 analysis date.
- An undated upgrade review by an individual reviewer (collected 2026-10-23) describes
BoosterOwnerSecondaryas proposed and not executed. On Ethereum at block 26289853 (2026-10-28), the owner chain shows it in place, and the booster owner contract is sealed. - A curated snapshot (2026-03-09) rated the product "Good" with "No death spiral concerns". The wind-down proposal (source reliability: unverified publisher) describes the opposite, and the economic report treats the snapshot as historical.
- The overview says it is not confirmed that the
AuraProxyOFTsudo address can callrescue(). The governance report reads an 8-of-13 Sudo Safe callingrescueon both bridge contracts, so the gap is partly closed. - The official sunset page says pools are in withdrawal-only mode. On Ethereum at block 26289853 (2026-10-28), the
BoosterreportsisShutdown: truewith 283 pools, andAuraLockeris also shut down. This agrees with the page.
Key Strengths
- Both high-severity audit findings for Aura Finance are fixed, and 21 of 28 medium findings are fixed. Two of those mediums are estimated mediums: the report states no rating, so this is an AI estimate.
- Review volume is large: three Halborn engagements, one Zellic assessment with no findings, and a public Code4rena contest (source reliability: unverified publisher). Several of these reports, including the fixed-finding counts above, are hosted on publications not verified as auditor-controlled. That lowers source confidence but not coverage credit.
- The Ethereum
Booster,AuraLockerand measured sidechain boosters report shutdown, which limits new actions.BoosterOwneris sealed with a 30-day forced-action delay that has not started. - The official site promises that LP, vault and locker positions stay withdrawable at any time.
- No exploit of Aura is recorded in the hacks dataset, and a 4-of-7 Safe can pause the bridge proxies at once.
Key Risks
- auraBAL is locked until 2027-05-10 and tracks Balancer's market. Likelihood: high that holders wait until Stage 3, medium that BAL price moves hurt them materially. Magnitude: the USD 9.7M TVL is context, not a loss ceiling, and the auraBAL share is not measured. Holders carry the BAL/WETH price move over the roughly six months to Stage 3, plus any early-exit cost. A loss of principal is not ruled out, because final proceeds are not compared with each holder's original contribution.
- LPs exit into Balancer pools, and a Balancer change dated 2026-10-30 is two days away. The date comes from a community-publication forum proposal, and the vote result is unconfirmed. Likelihood: medium for a worse exit or tooling problem, low for permanent loss. Magnitude: up to the Ethereum-held TVL for LPs who delay, though Balancer says withdrawals stay open.
- The redemption and admin path has no audit in the sources and no named operators. Likelihood: low to medium for a contract or key failure, and medium for a user losing funds to a fake site or a mistaken claim. Magnitude: the claims exposed are treasury assets for AURA redeemers and, for auraBAL, 90% of the BPT position. The treasury and BPT position sizes are not measured, so no dollar ceiling is given.
- Shared admin keys with no delay. One address sits on four Safes and owns the contract that owns each of the eight Ethereum-side bridge receivers. Compromise is low likelihood and moderate impact.
- Open audit findings remain. Seven medium findings are not fixed: 3 disputed, 3 acknowledged and 1 with no stated status. Two disputed voting-power findings (Code4rena M-03 and M-08) describe a pattern still present in the latest repository code.
Critical Findings
No critical findings identified. The ledger lists two high findings for Aura Finance, both fixed. A high finding for AuraSoulsV1 (a different product) is open and is excluded from Aura Finance counts.
Recommendation
Aura suits risk-tolerant holders who need to exit and can accept Balancer price risk until 2027-05-10. Holders who can leave now through LP, vault or locker withdrawal should consider doing so before Balancer's reported 2026-10-30 change. Use only the official site, because lookalike sites describe redemption limits. The worst case is a compromise of shared admin keys or a fault in redemption contracts that have no audit in the sources. New deposits make no sense for a closing protocol.
Report Sections
- Protocol Overview
- Code Security
- Economic Security
- Social & Team
- Governance
- Cross-Risk Analysis
Audit Reports (11)
Code4rena
Community auditView reportAuditware
Tier 2View reportUnknown auditor
View reportUnknown auditor
View reportZellic
Tier 2View reportUnknown auditor
View reportHALBORN
Tier 2View reportHALBORN
Tier 2View reportUnknown auditor
View reportZellic
Tier 2View reportHALBORN
Tier 2View report