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Aura

Tier 4

aura

Yield
ArbitrumAvalancheBaseEthereumFraxtalOptimism

Aura Finance is a protocol built on top of the Balancer system to provide maximum incentives to Balancer liquidity providers and BAL stakers (into veBAL) through social aggregation of BAL deposits and Aura's native token.

TVL

$9.66M

DeFiLlama
Updated 28 Oct 2026 UTC

Security score

5.7/10

Research 28 Oct 2026 UTC

Known contract addresses

Not measured yet

Verified source available

Unknown

Measured lines of own deployed code

35,876

Collected reports

11

Analysis Overview

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Protocol Overview

Aura was a Balancer yield booster that pooled users' Balancer LP tokens and BAL to earn boosted rewards. It is now winding down: pools are withdrawal-only, and AURA and auraBAL holders redeem in stages, with the final stages on 2027-05-10. The main deposit and locker contracts read as shut down, and a multisig needing 4 of 7 signers controls the key Ethereum contracts. About USD 9.7M of TVL remains, all on Ethereum, and the redemption contracts have no audit in the sources.
How it works →
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Code Security

5.9/10
Aura has several reviews: a Code4rena contest, three Halborn audits and one Zellic assessment. Most of the eleven audit files, including the contest, are hosted on publications not verified as auditor-controlled, which lowers source confidence but not coverage credit. Both high findings are fixed, and 21 of 28 medium findings are fixed, including two medium (estimated) items where the report gave no rating. Deployed code was not compared with any audited version, so live-contract coverage is unconfirmed rather than disproved. Bug bounty status is unknown.
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Economic Security

4.5/10
Aura is no longer an operating yield product: pools are withdrawal-only and holders redeem against treasury assets and Balancer pool tokens. auraBAL holders must wait until 2027-05-10, and LP withdrawals return Balancer pool tokens that must then be exited through Balancer. Balancer's own wind-down, with a change dated 2026-10-30, is reported only by community and unverified sources and is unconfirmed. No loss-cover fund was found, and evidence on oracles, yield and liquidity depth is thin.
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Team & Transparency

6.2/10
Aura is closing, and the sources name no individual team members, only pseudonymous handles. The app terms name Endpoint Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company, but only for the website and interface, not as accountable for the protocol. Contract addresses and code are public, and no exploit of Aura itself is recorded; one unverified post claiming a hack is uncorroborated. No bug bounty or treasury reports were found, and the security page could not be retrieved.
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Governance

3.7/10
The shutdown was decided by Snapshot votes, but on-chain control sits with a Safe multisig needing 4 of 7 signers, which makes many owner calls with a measured delay of zero; no timelock was found and whether votes bind it is unconfirmed. A single key can instantly rescue tokens from an auraBAL vault reward handler, likely limited to in-transit rewards. A separate Sudo Safe (8 of 13 signers) can rescue bridge tokens, and an individual reviewer's sidechain report (unverified host) rates a malicious sudo minting tokens as Low-Medium, fix status unknown.
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Cross-Analysis

For holders, the main risk is getting value out, not yield. auraBAL is locked until 2027-05-10 with no confirmed market exit, and its payout tracks Balancer's market. The Balancer wind-down and its 2026-10-30 date are unconfirmed, coming only from community-tier and unverified sources; if it happens, LP exits could lose interface and routing support, but Balancer says withdrawals stay open, so the likelier loss is worse-priced or stranded exits, not frozen funds. Redemption contracts have no audit in the sources, and admin keys are shared among unnamed signers.

Who controls

Research: 28 Oct 2026 UTC

Not measured

Recent control events

Not measured

Governance voting

Not measured

Audit coverage

Audit coverage could not be verified

Measured lines: 35,876 · Measured files: 185

Unmeasured files: 0 · Unmeasured components: 11

See audits and sources

Loss cover

TVL at research time: $9,706,305.83

No loss-cover funds documented in this research.

Executive Summary

Executive Summary: Aura

Aura is a closing protocol. Its pools accept withdrawals only, and AURA and auraBAL holders redeem in stages through 2027-05-10. The main risks for a holder are getting value out, not earning yield. No exploit of Aura is recorded, but no audit of the redemption path is in the sources, deployed code was never compared with any audited version, and the people running the admin keys are not named. Confidence is moderate.

Safety Rating

Overall Score: 5.7/10 Dimension scores: Code security 5.9 · Economic security 4.5 · Team transparency 6.2 · Governance 3.7 · Track record 8.6

Scores by dimension, points out of 10 (points)
Code security
5.9 points
Economic security
4.5 points
Team transparency
6.2 points
Governance
3.7 points
Track record
8.6 points

Aura is winding down, so the rating reflects exit risk more than yield risk. Two score caps apply in principle: one because audit scope could not be linked to the deployed contracts, and one because core economic facts are unknown. Neither cap is binding on the displayed scores. The scores come from the worker reports and are not changed here.

Scores by Dimension

DimensionKey Finding
Code SecurityBoth high findings are fixed and 21 of 28 medium findings are fixed (two of the 28 are medium (estimated): an AI estimate, because that report states no rating), but audits were not linked to the deployed code.
Economic SecurityAura is in a governance-approved wind-down. auraBAL holders wait until 2027-05-10, and evidence on liquidity, oracles and loss cover is thin.
Team TransparencyA legal entity is named for the website only, and no individual team member is named.
GovernanceA 4-of-7 Safe (multisig wallet) holds owner powers with a measured delay of zero, and the link between Snapshot votes and the Safe is unconfirmed.
Track RecordAura ran from mid-2022 with no recorded exploit of its own contracts, but no complete outage or pause history exists.

What This Protocol Does

Aura let holders of Balancer liquidity-provider tokens or BAL tokens hand them to Aura and earn boosted rewards without managing Balancer's long veBAL lock themselves. It is now ending: the official site says pools are withdrawal-only. DeFiLlama shows about USD 9.7M of remaining deposits, all on Ethereum.

Documented vs On-Chain

  • The official sunset page says the final stage is "in 6 months". That wording is stale against the 2026-10-28 analysis date.
  • An undated upgrade review by an individual reviewer (collected 2026-10-23) describes BoosterOwnerSecondary as proposed and not executed. On Ethereum at block 26289853 (2026-10-28), the owner chain shows it in place, and the booster owner contract is sealed.
  • A curated snapshot (2026-03-09) rated the product "Good" with "No death spiral concerns". The wind-down proposal (source reliability: unverified publisher) describes the opposite, and the economic report treats the snapshot as historical.
  • The overview says it is not confirmed that the AuraProxyOFT sudo address can call rescue(). The governance report reads an 8-of-13 Sudo Safe calling rescue on both bridge contracts, so the gap is partly closed.
  • The official sunset page says pools are in withdrawal-only mode. On Ethereum at block 26289853 (2026-10-28), the Booster reports isShutdown: true with 283 pools, and AuraLocker is also shut down. This agrees with the page.

Key Strengths

  • Both high-severity audit findings for Aura Finance are fixed, and 21 of 28 medium findings are fixed. Two of those mediums are estimated mediums: the report states no rating, so this is an AI estimate.
  • Review volume is large: three Halborn engagements, one Zellic assessment with no findings, and a public Code4rena contest (source reliability: unverified publisher). Several of these reports, including the fixed-finding counts above, are hosted on publications not verified as auditor-controlled. That lowers source confidence but not coverage credit.
  • The Ethereum Booster, AuraLocker and measured sidechain boosters report shutdown, which limits new actions. BoosterOwner is sealed with a 30-day forced-action delay that has not started.
  • The official site promises that LP, vault and locker positions stay withdrawable at any time.
  • No exploit of Aura is recorded in the hacks dataset, and a 4-of-7 Safe can pause the bridge proxies at once.

Key Risks

  • auraBAL is locked until 2027-05-10 and tracks Balancer's market. Likelihood: high that holders wait until Stage 3, medium that BAL price moves hurt them materially. Magnitude: the USD 9.7M TVL is context, not a loss ceiling, and the auraBAL share is not measured. Holders carry the BAL/WETH price move over the roughly six months to Stage 3, plus any early-exit cost. A loss of principal is not ruled out, because final proceeds are not compared with each holder's original contribution.
  • LPs exit into Balancer pools, and a Balancer change dated 2026-10-30 is two days away. The date comes from a community-publication forum proposal, and the vote result is unconfirmed. Likelihood: medium for a worse exit or tooling problem, low for permanent loss. Magnitude: up to the Ethereum-held TVL for LPs who delay, though Balancer says withdrawals stay open.
  • The redemption and admin path has no audit in the sources and no named operators. Likelihood: low to medium for a contract or key failure, and medium for a user losing funds to a fake site or a mistaken claim. Magnitude: the claims exposed are treasury assets for AURA redeemers and, for auraBAL, 90% of the BPT position. The treasury and BPT position sizes are not measured, so no dollar ceiling is given.
  • Shared admin keys with no delay. One address sits on four Safes and owns the contract that owns each of the eight Ethereum-side bridge receivers. Compromise is low likelihood and moderate impact.
  • Open audit findings remain. Seven medium findings are not fixed: 3 disputed, 3 acknowledged and 1 with no stated status. Two disputed voting-power findings (Code4rena M-03 and M-08) describe a pattern still present in the latest repository code.

Critical Findings

No critical findings identified. The ledger lists two high findings for Aura Finance, both fixed. A high finding for AuraSoulsV1 (a different product) is open and is excluded from Aura Finance counts.

Recommendation

Aura suits risk-tolerant holders who need to exit and can accept Balancer price risk until 2027-05-10. Holders who can leave now through LP, vault or locker withdrawal should consider doing so before Balancer's reported 2026-10-30 change. Use only the official site, because lookalike sites describe redemption limits. The worst case is a compromise of shared admin keys or a fault in redemption contracts that have no audit in the sources. New deposits make no sense for a closing protocol.

Report Sections

  • Protocol Overview
  • Code Security
  • Economic Security
  • Social & Team
  • Governance
  • Cross-Risk Analysis

Audit Reports (11)

Preview3 · Default / Rows